

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: UARS
 NAME/QUANTITY: Knob/1
 DRAWING REFERENCE: JLU76-20666

PROJECT: UARS
 LRU NAME/QUANTITY: PFR Payload Bay Attachment
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10159-10037-02
 SUBSYSTEM: EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NO. UARS-TM-002	CRITICALITY 2/LR	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
FUNCTION	Activates attachment jaws of clamp to secure PFR clamp to rail in order to deploy PFR at desired location.	END ITEM Cannot remove clamp or release pin for PFR extension tube stowage.	A. Design Sufficient interface tolerances are used to ensure proper operation. The knob is fabricated from aluminum and the shaft is stainless steel. This shaft interfaces with a titanium housing and bronze brushing.
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	Knob jams closed in deployed position. Cause: 1. Galling 2. Contamination	MISSION None	B. Test/Analysis Assembly will be functionally cycled to ensure proper operation. Knob has been thermally tested during certification testing per (TPS # 11590054).
REDUNDANCY SCREENS	REMAINING PATHS	CREW/VEHICLE Unable to close PDR doors with double failure.	C. Inspection All piece parts will be inspected for conformance to the applicable drawings before and after any spec process.
A-Pass B-N/A C-Pass	Leave clamp attached to rail, remove PFR with Quick Release Pin.	INTERFACE None	PDA (PreDelivery Acceptance) will be performed on all end items. Knob is checked for proper function and checked for whether it locks and unlocks without binding.
MISSION PHASE	TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT	ALL piece parts are cleaned and processed to ILC Cleaning, Packaging, Handling, Shipping, and Storage
EVA	Hours	Minutes	

PREPARED BY: Ron Brune

REVISION:

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REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: UARS
 NAME/QUANTITY: Kopfb/1
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10176-20666

PROJECT: UARS
 LRU NAME/QUANTITY: PFR Payload Bay AT Clamp
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10179-10037-02

SUBSYSTEM: ALL
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NO. UARS-FM-002	CRITICALITY 2/JR	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
FUNCTION	Activates attachment jaws of clamp to secure PFR clamp to rail in order to deploy PFR at desired location.	END ITEM	C. Inspection (cont.) Procedures for Space Shuttle Crew Equipment; Document #10107-70009.
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	Knob jams closed in deployed position. Cause: 1. Galling 2. Contamination	MISSION	D. Failure History None.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS	REMAINING PATHS	CREW/VEHICLE	E. Ground Turnaround PDA/PIA will be performed on all end items.
A-Pass B-N/A C-Pass	Leave clamp attached to rail, remove PFR with Quick Release Pin.	INTERFACE	F. Operational Use 1. Operational Effect of failure None 2. Crew Action a. Remove PFR extension and stow. b. Try to remove clamp with 7/16" socket ratchet by driving the 7/16" interface on the knob to the point where the clamp can be removed. 3. Crew Training Crew is aware of failure and contingencies to overcome failure.
MISSION PHASE	TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT	
EVA	Hours	Minutes	

PREPARED BY: Ron Brune REVISION: --
 APPROVED BY: -----

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ISSUED DATE:

DATE

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CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

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REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: UARS
 NAME/QUANTITY: Knob/1
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10126-20666

PROJECT: UARS
 LRU NAME/QUANTITY: PFR Payload Bay Attachment Clamp Assembly
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10159-10017-02

SUBSYSTEM: PFR Payload Bay Attachment
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NO. <u>UARS-TM-002</u>	CRITICALITY <u>2/IR</u>	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
FUNCTION	Activates attachment jaws of clamp to secure PFR clamp to rail in order to deploy PFR at desired location.	ENDITEM Cannot remove clamp or release pin for PFR extension tube stowage.	1. Operational Use (cont.) 4. Mission Constraints None, clamp is mounted on the rail which has been designed with half holes allowing interface with the sheer pin of the clamp. This prevents any sliding motion. The clamp has also been designed to withstand landing loads should it remain on the rail during landing.
FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	Knob jams closed in deployed position. Cause: 1. Galling 2. Contamination	MISSION None	5. In-Flight Checkout None
REDUNDANCY SCREENS	REMAINING PATHS	CREW/VEHICLE Unable to close PLB doors with double failure.	
A-Pass B-N/A C-Pass	Leave clamp attached to rail, remove PFR with Quick Release Pin.	INTERFACE None	
MISSION PHASE	TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT	
FVA	Hours	Minutes	

PREPARED BY: Ivan Bruce
 APPROVED BY: John Brune

REVISION:

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DATE:

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 ATTACHMENT
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